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Editorial  
This issue builds and improves upon the findings that we presented in 2010 (see Vol. 
4, No. 1). We have incorporated data covering a nine year period; from 2005 to 2014. 
Our main focus is the football Clubs that - even for a single season- competed in the 
Super League.  
Sports often have a profound impact on communities, social cohesion, identity and 
self-esteem, health, lifestyles and, as is increasingly being accepted, the environment. 
Undoubtedly, the economic effect of professional football in local communities is 
large. It is a common phenomenon for football clubs to form strong bonds with their 
local authorities and develop a relationship of mutual interest. Local communities 
benefit from football as the clubs offer employment opportunities and attract a large 
number of fans who spend generously in the communities’ facilities. At the same time, 
football clubs increase the reputation and present the positive image of the 
communities, operating as advertising channels which would have been impossible 
for some small cities to afford. 
Football industry is characterized by a significant peculiarity which distinguishes it 
from other businesses. Football clubs’ mission is based on the improvement of their 
sporting performance, rather than only to maximize the clubs’ profitability and value 
for their owners and shareholders. In order to achieve their mission, football clubs 
decide to “gamble” on success by investing significant amounts of money in players’ 
wages and transfers.  
Governance of football is based on the ‘European model of sport’, a hierarchical 
scheme whose main characteristic is the organization from an international to a 
national and finally to a local level. FIFA - the international governing body of 
association football (“Fédération Internationale de Football Association”) - and its 
major duties are the imposition of the rules of the game, which should be adhered to 
by the member-countries, and the organization of popular international competitions 
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as the World cup, which is held every 4 years. FIFA comprises of 209 national 
associations, a number which exceeds even the one of the United Nations members 
(http://www.fifa.com/associations/). Simultaneously, depending on the continent 
they are situated, FIFA’s members-nations also belong to the respective continental 
confederation, which constitutes a FIFA’s subcategory (e.g. Union of European 
Football Associations, known as UEFA). Furthermore, continental confederations are 
consisted of the national federations. Every country has its own national federation 
which organizes the football in club and national representative levels, approving 
officially the formation as well as the running of domestic leagues. The lowest level of 
the pyramid, national open leagues, is formed by the football clubs which participate 
in the domestic championships. The basic duty of the national leagues is to organize 
the domestic championships’ and the way they are managed varies across countries. 
The increasing commercialisation of sports calls for a professionalisation of the 
football clubs. Due to this development and the increasing competitiveness in the 
national leagues, the demand of efficient use of resources within a football club is 
becoming more and more relevant. 
Within the above in mind the Hellenic Observatory of Corporate Governance 
continues its effort to research the governance of Football clubs; we believe that we 
offer insights that are both unique and extremely interesting. 
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The Board of Directors in Greek Football Clubs: 2005-2014 
 
Nowadays, it is an undeniable fact that football (“soccer” in North America) constitutes the most 
popular sport worldwide, especially in Europe and South America. Over the past two decades, 
football underwent a great number of vital changes which transformed its contemporary nature and 
organisation (Capasso and Rossi, 2013). More specifically, football clubs adopted innovative financial 
and organisational strategies which helped them to develop not only as sports teams but also as 
businesses (Grundy, 2004). Moreover, they progressed significantly in important areas, including 
marketing and media, as well as the modernisation of their facilities (i.e. football stadiums, training 
centres). The business orientation of the clubs is continually growing, as they have been converted 
into sports and media businesses (Callejo and Forcadell, 2006). 
 
Football in the 21st century 
Modern football teams have taken the form of competitive companies and football has evolved into 
a significant capital market. During the last decade a large amount of money has been invested on 
football, a sport which is considered as hyper-commodified due to the consolidation of global 
capitalism in modern societies (Hognestad, 2012). Clubs spend excessive sums of money for players’ 
transfers and wages, while sponsors pay extravagant sums for advertisement. At the same time 
media compete with each other, offering huge sums, in order to obtain the television broadcasting 
rights of football leagues and competitions (Guzman and Morrow, 2007).  
The above developments have radically transformed the contemporary football industry and the 
football clubs’ revenues have been rocketed (Dimitropoulos, 2010). Furthermore, clubs’ viability and 
sustainability depend on their generated income from sponsorship deals, media packages, 
commercial development and stadium earnings (Ogbonna and Harris, 2014). Diagram 1 shows the 
income of the 20 richest clubs in the world, which take advantage both their brand name in 
commercial terms (broadcasting rights, sponsorships, merchandising, and tickets) as well as their on-
field successes. The “Deloitte Football Money League”, an annual financial report, which presents the 
20 highest earning football clubs in the world, indicates that during the 2012/13 football season, 
there was a further growth of the 20 clubs’ total revenue, compared to the previous season. More 
specifically, the clubs’ total income reached the astronomical amount of €5.4 bn., increased by 8%, 
compared to the respective income of the 2011/12 season (€5 bn).  
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Furthermore, 18 out of 20 clubs come from the so-called “big five” European leagues (English 
“Premier League”, Spanish “Primera Division”, German “Bundesliga”, Italian “Serie A” and French 
“Ligue 1”). In general, every year the “top 20” is characterized by a limited number of changes, as the 
overwhelming majority of them maintain their position in this “special” table. The reasons for this 
fact are the high reputation of the clubs, and their participation in popular national leagues as well 
as European tournaments. These reasons guarantee constant revenues’ generation for the clubs and 
consequently a permanent presence in the Deloitte “Football Money League”. 
 
 
Diagram 1: Top 20 football clubs in revenue (2012/13 season) 
Source: Deloitte Football Money League 2014 
 
Football Clubs: What are they for?  
Football industry is characterized by a significant peculiarity which distinguishes it from other 
industries (Hamil et al., 2004). Football clubs’ missions are based on the improvement of their 
sporting performance, rather than maximizing the clubs’ profitability and value for their owners and 
shareholders (Capasso and Rossi, 2013). In order to achieve their mission, football clubs decide to 
“gamble” on success by investing astronomical amounts of money in players’ wages and transfers; 
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the “overspending” on playing talents increases considerably the possibility of future on-field 
successes (Michie and Oughton, 2005).  
Paradoxically, as clubs’ revenues are increasing, their profitability is substantially decreasing (Hamil 
et al., 2004). The most important reasons for overinvestment in football industry are the dramatic 
increase of the winning possibilities and the large sums given to the clubs by TV broadcasting rights, 
as well as the commercialisation of their brand (Franck, 2010). Accordingly, the changes in the 
competition rules of European football gave to the clubs more incentives to overinvest. Money buys 
sporting success and the clubs’ competitive position depends on their ability to spend. This 
phenomenon is prevalent in Europe, as European football clubs are often utility maximisers and aim 
mainly to sporting successes, unlike American clubs which are profit maximisers and seek to improve 
their economic performance (Ascari and Gagnepain, 2006).  
The majority of professional football clubs tends to invest rapidly the profits earned in order to 
increase its sporting competitiveness, usually at the expense of clubs’ shareholders (Michie and 
Oughton, 2005). Profit is considered as a burden and a constraint which denies the clubs’ 
improvement in on-field performance (Franck, 2010). Moreover, the majority of football clubs opt 
not to be enlisted in the stock market, in order to avoid the financial responsibilities towards their 
shareholders and the commitment on the stock market’s regulation (Ascari and Gagnepain, 2006). In 
general, financial decisions from the clubs are rarely taken due to business reasons, but they are 
mainly sports-oriented (Emery and Weed, 2006). 
Despite the lack of profitability and the non-satisfactory economic performance by the majority of 
football clubs, football industry continues to attract investors and entrepreneurs who are willing to 
own a football club, even when they know that the possibilities to lose money are extremely high. 
Undoubtedly, their basic motivations have a personal and nonfinancial character (Hamil and Walters, 
2010). Potential investors usually are interested to own football clubs because of their deep love for 
the game, their desire to “live the dream” by seeking sporting successes and glory. Additionally, 
sometimes another significant incentive of ownership is the development of public relations, new 
contacts and the promotion of other businesses’ interests. Finally, there are cases of people who 
invest in football, as they want to become well-known and powerful in order to satisfy their vanity. 
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Impact of Football in National Economies 
As mentioned above, football, apart from a sport, constitutes a business activity with a large impact 
on its stakeholders’ revenues as well as on national economies. Undeniably, football tournaments, 
especially the most popular ones, have an effect on the countries’ economies.  
ABN AMRO in its Soccernomics Report for the Germany World Cup 2006 reveals that there is a 0.7% 
average increase in the economic growth rate of the country whose national team wins the World 
Cup. Furthermore, there are major economic benefits for the winning country as its compound 
annual growth rate is expected to be increased by 2.7% per year.  
On a similar issue, the “winning” country’s stock market outperforms by 3.5% in the first month after 
the victory, before it underperforms and loses its gain (Goldman Sachs, 2014). More specifically, this 
pattern of short-term outperformance was noticed to all the winning countries since 1974, except 
from Brazil in 2002.  
On the contrary, the economic growth rate of the World Cup runner-up country declines by 0.3% on 
average. Additionally, its stock market, experiences a decline of 2% over the first month, except from 
the case of Argentina (1990) whose equity market outperformed by 33%. Additionally, the majority 
of runners’-up experience further underperformance in their stock markets, falling by 5.6% after the 
first three months (Goldman Sachs, 2014).  
It is worth mentioning that the host nation’s stock market outperforms by 2.7% on average in the 
month after the competition, but this starts falling rapidly. According to the same report, there is no 
doubt that the ultimate target for the host country is to win the tournament, but even in this case 
the positive performance is maintained only for the first month. Hence, we can say with certainty 
that the economic impact in the countries’ economies is not major and does not affect them in the 
longer term. 
Undoubtedly, the economic and social impact of professional football in local communities is large 
(Senaux, 2008). It is a common phenomenon for football clubs to form strong bonds with their local 
authorities and develop a relationship of mutual interest (Walters, 2009). Local communities benefit 
from football as the clubs product welfare, employment and attract a large number of fans who 
spend massively in the communities’ facilities. At the same time, football clubs increase the 
reputation and present the positive images of the communities, operating as advertising means, 
which would have been impossible for some small cities to afford (Senaux, 2008). In general, local 
communities are highly dependent on football teams and in many cases their economic sustainability 
is closely related to them (Walters, 2009). 
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Financial Crisis in European Football 
Financial crisis is catching up with the European football industry. This crisis has been created by 
football clubs’ extravagant revenues by media, sponsors and their commercial activities, which 
allowed them to spend large amounts of money on players’ transfers and wages in order to increase 
their sporting performance (Capasso and Rossi, 2013). As such, football clubs accumulate significant 
losses and debts, which put in danger their financial viability and increase the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, this financial mismanagement and instability often leads to the clubs’ 
inability to protect the interests of their shareholders (Dimitropoulos, 2011).  
In 2009, UEFA’s Executive Committee approved unanimously the “Financial Fair Play” (FFP) regulation 
(UEFA, 2012), in order to confront the financial instability in European football industry. It was 
implemented from the 2011-12 season onwards and it constitutes an effort to improve football clubs’ 
financial rationality, transparency, sustainability and discipline (Grant Thornton, 2012). More 
specifically, it aims to combat successfully the modern phenomenon of “overspending”, which 
generates excessive sums of debts. Furthermore, via the “Financial Fair Play” UEFA aims at protecting 
the viability of European club football in general. For this perspective, UEFA established a system 
called “Club Licensing” in order to achieve the aforementioned financial goals.  “Club Licensing” 
obligates the clubs which participate in the two UEFA continental club competitions (Champions’ 
League and Europa League) to satisfy the necessary financial requirements in order to be granted a 
license of participation (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006). 
 
An Overview of Greek Football 
a. Greek football clubs and Super League 
Greek football is not characterized by significant international successes in club level, in comparison 
with the national Greek team which managed to win the European Cup in 2004. The highest 
professional national league is called “Super League” (SL) and was formed in 2006, replacing “Alpha 
Ethniki”. Super League is subject to the legislations of FIFA, UEFA, and Hellenic Football Federation 
(HFF) and is a member of EPFL (European Professional Football Leagues). Super League cooperative 
remains responsible for the administration and running of the top tier professional championship. 
From the 2012/13 football season onwards, it is consisted of 18 teams, the majority of which had 
limited budget and is locally orientated. In the end of the current season (2013/14), 5 of these 18 
clubs will be qualified for the European competitions (Champions’ League, Europa League). 
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Greek football clubs are usually owned by businessmen and entrepreneurs, who have often the full 
control of their clubs’ administration and running. Super League’s competitiveness is considerably 
low; since only four clubs prevail in terms of sporting achievements, revenues and popularity 
(Olympiacos, Panathinaikos, AEK, PAOK). 
Diagram 2 presents basic financials indicators of the Super League, during the 2007-2013 periods. 
League’s gross revenues slightly increased from €10.4m to €11.6m (11.5% increase) in 7 years. It is 
noteworthy to mention that in 2009 the Super League’s income reached the impressive amount of 
€24.9m (a 140% increase compared to 2007). Furthermore, there was a moderate increase in the 
league’s expenditure during the first 4 years of its running, but finally they decreased by 14.1%, falling 
from €9.2m in 2007 to €7.9m in 2013.  
Moreover, regarding the financial contribution of the league to the participating football clubs, the 
largest amount spent was €12.6m in 2009, increasing by 1251% in comparison with the 2007 
(€0.93m). Nevertheless as it can be seen during the last two years the amount has been dramatically 
dropped in the following years, reaching the €1.3m in 2013. Overall, despite the significant 
fluctuations during these 7 years there was a 38.7% increase from 2007 to 2013. 
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b. Regulatory Frameworks  
The first Greek football clubs were amateur, with local presentation and were founded in the last 
decades of the 19th century; mainly in the beginning of the 20th century. In 1979 there was a radical 
change in the organization of the football clubs as the Greek government obliged them to obtain a 
professional formation, according to the Law 789/1979. Greek government created a new legislative 
framework due to the constant development of the sport worldwide and its growing reputation. 
According to the latest Law (L. 2725/1999), clubs operate following a common organizational, 
administrational and economic regulatory framework. 
This has created a new professional environment which helped the football clubs to adopt a more 
international character and integrate better in the development of the sport. Finally, Greek football 
clubs became public limited companies “S.A.” (Société Anonyme) and their capital assets had the 
form of shares. 
Nowadays, governance of Greek football is based on the laws and the regulation imposed by the 
Ministry of Economy, Infrastructure, Shipping and Tourism (http://www.mindev.gov.gr/el/).  
In 1999, an independent body called “Professional Athletics Committee” 
(http://gga.gov.gr/sxetika/anexarthtes-arxes/epitroph-epaggelmatikou-athlitismou) was founded (L. 
2725/1999) in order to confront the severe inconsistencies of the majority of football clubs by 
supervising efficiently theirs’ operations. Hellenic Football Federation (HFF, www.epo.gr/) was 
founded in 1926, became an UEFA member in 1954. It is responsible for the Greek National Team 
and the running of the Greek Cup competition.  
The main characteristic of Greek football clubs is their economic and administrational independence. 
They keep books with all the decisions of their board and third class accounting books in compliance 
with the General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) introduced by the L. 4308/2014 (applied 
from 1.1.2015). Additionally, they also develop a budget and a balance sheet. Moreover, every year 
are also obliged to submit to the Professional Athletics Committee an income and expense budget 
for the new season at least 15 days before its start. 
c. Scandals and Corruption  
Similarly to the European football, Greek football is also affected by a deep economic crisis attributed 
to numerous cases of financial mismanagement by clubs’ directors and unstable political situation. 
Undeniably, the Greek economic crisis of the last few years, contributed decisively to the 
deterioration of the clubs’ financial status. Numerous Greek football clubs are characterized by 
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financial instability, accumulated debts and lack of liquidity which often lead them to bankruptcy. 
Paradoxically, despite the fact that these inconsistencies should lead to the withdrawal of clubs’ 
authorization by the competent committee, the authorities are extremely tolerant and allow the 
clubs to participate in the national competitions. Usually, Greek clubs fall under the Article 44, Law 
1892/90 and Article 99, Law 4013/11 which reduce dramatically or even cancel their debts. 
Furthermore, there are numerous cases in Greek football revealing that the financial 
mismanagement and the corruption constitute widespread phenomena. The most recent is an 
Interpol’s report referring to the beginning of a judicial investigation for the verification of criminal 
offences and the existence of a criminal organization in Greek football (Interpol, 2014).   
Greek State and the competent institutional bodies are the main culprits for the current situation 
because they often avoid implementing efficiently the existing laws or imposing stricter ones. The 
controlling and supervising mechanisms are weak and bendable and the frequent impunity of the 
corrupted directors is scandalous.  
 
Football Governing Bodies 
Governance of football is based on the ‘European model of sport’, a hierarchical scheme whose main 
characteristic is the organization from an international to a national and finally to a local level 
(Szymanski and Ross, 2007). The International Governing Body of Association Football is called FIFA 
(“Fédération Internationale de Football Association”) and its major duties are the imposition of the 
rules of the game, which should be adhered to by the member-countries, and the organization of 
popular international competitions as the World cup, which is held every 4 years (Ogbonna and 
Harris, 2013). FIFA comprises of 209 national associations, a number which exceeds even the one of 
the United Nations members (www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/associations.html). 
Simultaneously, depending on the continent they are situated, FIFA’s members-nations also belong 
to the respective continental confederation, which constitutes a FIFA’s subcategory (e.g. Union of 
European Football Associations, known as UEFA) (Capasso and Rossi, 2013).  
Furthermore, continental confederations are consisted of the national federations. Every country has 
its own national federation which organizes the football in clubs and national representative levels, 
approving officially the formation as well as the running of domestic leagues. The lowest level of the 
pyramid, national open leagues, is formed by the football clubs which participate in the domestic 
championships (Senaux, 2008). The basic duty of the national leagues is to organize the domestic 
championships’ and the way they are managed varies across countries (Capasso and Rossi, 2013). 
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Football clubs take part in leagues because the competition between them improve their 
profitability, their reputation and contribute to the leagues’ higher UEFA ranking. 
On the other hand there are some opposite views which consider that the numerous recent changes 
in football industry led to the creation of a new hierarchical model of governance (Amara et al., 2005; 
Lee, 2008). This model is characterized by the presence and interaction of a large number of 
stakeholders. Additionally, a complex network of interconnections is developed between the 
different stakeholders (football players’ associations, governments, agents, media, sponsors etc.), 
who are continually trying to increase their influence and power in order to advance their own 
interests. According to these vies, the governing bodies of football continue to have an essential role 
but lose a large proportion of their governance and administration power. Hence, decisions are no 
longer taken exclusively by them, but constitute product of negotiations with the interested 
stakeholders (Amara et al., 2005).  
 
Corporate Governance in Football Clubs 
Football constitutes a peculiar and extremely demanding business, since clubs have to achieve not 
only sporting success but also fulfil ambitious organizational objectives (Michie and Oughton, 2005). 
To succeed in both domains and consequently satisfy the stakeholders’ expectations, it is necessary 
for clubs to have a proper corporate governance system. This can be accomplished by complying with 
the laws of corporate governance of their home country and following UEFA’s FFP as well as Club 
Licensing system regulations. 
Regardless of the recent improvements in the football governance mechanisms further changes are 
needed (Michie and Oughton, 2005). This will require well-organized reporting and auditing 
mechanisms, compliance with the codes and principles of corporate governance and effective 
communication between the clubs’ directors and their stakeholders. In general, high quality football 
corporate governance will contribute to the protection of the shareholders’ interests, shall  boosts 
the clubs’ economic results and might prevent mismanagement by directors in order to serve their 
personal interests.  
 
Methodology 
The following pages describe issues regarding the sampling approach and the variables’ that have 
been examined. Data related to the characteristics of Greek football clubs’ boards of directors has 
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been collected, by accessing the “Government Gazette” as well as the appropriate “Société 
Anonyme” issues for every club. “Government Gazette” constitutes the official journal of the Greek 
government, published in the National Printing House (www.et.gr/). 
a. Population and Sample 
This research concentrates on the board characteristics of 31 Greek professional football clubs which 
have participated at least once in the highest professional football league, named “Super League”, 
during the past 9 years (from the 2005-06 football season to 2013-14).  
 
No TEAMS EMBLEM 
YEAR 
FOUNDED 
LOCATION 
YEARS 
IN S.L. 
STADIUM 
CAPACITY 
1 AEK 
 
1924 Athens 8 69,618 
2 AEL 1964 
 
1964 Larisa 6 16,118 
3 AEL KALLONIS 
 
1994 Lesvos 1 3,300 
4 AKRATITOS 
 
1963 Athens 1 4,944 
5 APOLLON 
 
1891 Athens 1 14,200 
6 
APOLLON 
KALAMARIAS  
1926 Thessaloniki 3 6,500 
7 ARIS 
 
1914 Thessaloniki 8 22,800 
8 ASTERAS TRIPOLIS 
 
1931 Tripoli 7 7,493 
9 
ATROMITOS 
ATHINON  
1923 Athens 8 8,969 
10 DOXA DRAMAS 
 
1918 Drama 1 7,000 
11 EGALEO 
 
1931 Athens 2 8,217 
12 ERGOTELIS 
 
1929 Heraklion 7 26,000 
13 IONIKOS 
 
1965 Athens 2 4,999 
14 IRAKLIS 
 
1908 Thessaloniki 6 27,770 
15 KALITHEA 
 
1966 Athens 1 4,250 
16 KAVALA 
 
1965 Kavala 2 12,550 
17 KERKYRA 
 
1968 Corfu 4 3,000 
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18 LEVADIAKOS 
 
1961 Livadia 7 8,000 
19 OFI 
 
1925 Heraklion 7 8,150 
20 OLYMPIACOS 
 
1925 Piraeus 9 32,115 
21 
OLYMPIAKOS 
VOLOU  
1937 Volos 1 9000 
22 PANATHINAIKOS 
 
1908 Athens 9 16,003 
23 PANETOLIKOS 
 
1926 Agrinio 2 6,000 
24 PANIONIOS 
 
1890 Athens 9 11,115 
25 PANSERRAIKOS 
 
1964 Serres 2 9,500 
26 PANTHRAKIKOS 
 
1963 Komotini 4 6,700 
27 PAOK 
 
1926 Thessaloniki 9 28,703 
28 PAS GIANNINA 
 
1966 Ioannina 4 7,500 
29 
PLATANIAS 
CHANION  
1931 Chania 2 3,700 
30 SKODA XANTHI 
 
1967 Xanthi 9 7,244 
31 THRASYVOULOS 
 
1938 Athens 1 3,142 
32 VERIA 
 
1960 Veria 3 6,350 
Table 1: Greek Football Clubs in Super League (2005-2014)  
The board characteristics are examined only for the years that the clubs were participating in Super 
League. The actual number of these clubs is 32, but “Doxa Dramas” which despite the fact that 
participated in Super League during the 2010-11 season, did not have any information available 
regarding their directors and financial status, therefore it is represented only in the “football clubs’ 
location” as well as “football clubs’ age” charts (Table 1). 
Diagram 3 presents the geographical location of the 32 teams which took part in Super League from 
2005 to 2014, based on the regional units established by the Greek government in 2011 (Kallikratis 
Plan, Law 3852/2010).  
The football clubs which participated in Super League from 2005 to 2014 come from: 
 11 from Attica (AEK, Akratitos, Apollon, Atromitos Athinon, Egaleo, Ionikos, Kallithea, 
Olympiacos, Panathinaikos, Panionios, Thrasyvoulos)  
 6 from Central Macedonia (Apollon Kalamarias, Aris, Iraklis, Panserraikos, PAOK, Veria) 
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 4 from East Macedonia & Thrace (Doxa Dramas, Kavala, Panthrakikos, Skoda Xanthi) 
 3 from Crete (Ergotelis, OFI, Platanias Chanion) 
 2 from Thessaly (AEL 1964, Olympiakos Volou) 
 1 from Epirus (Pas Giannina) 
 1 from Central Greece (Levadiakos) 
 1 from West Greece (Panetolikos) 
 1 from Peloponnese (Asteras Tripolis) 
 1 from North Aegean (AEL Kallonis) 
 1 from Ionian Islands (Kerkyra) 
 
The pie-chart below (Diagram 3) shows the geographical location of these 32 football clubs. 
 
Diagram 3: The geographical location of Greek football clubs (n=32) 
 
Diagram 4 illustrates the average age of the football clubs, which participated in the Super League, 
at least one time between 2005 and 2014, was 74.4 years. The oldest team is Panionios, which was 
founded 124 years ago and the youngest is AEL Kallonis, which was established just 20 years ago.  
More specifically football clubs can be divided in 5 different categories regarding their year of 
foundation: 
 1 club foundation year was 20-40 years ago (AEL Kallonis) 
 12 clubs’ age ranges between 41-60 years (AEL 1964, Akratitos, Ionikos, Kallithea, Kavala, 
Kerkyra, Levadiakos, Panserraikos, Panthrakikos, PAS Giannina, Skoda Xanthi, Veria) 
 2 clubs’ were founded between 61-80 years ago (Olympiakos Volou, Thrasyvoulos) 
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 13 clubs’ age varies from 81-100 years (AEK, Apollon Kalamarias, Aris, Asteras Tripolis, 
Atromitos Athinon, Doxa Dramas, Egaleo, Ergotelis, OFI, Olympiacos, Panetolikos, PAOK, 
Platanias Chanion,  
 4 clubs were founded from 101 to 125 years ago (Apollon, Iraklis, Panathinaikos, Panionios) 
 
Diagram 4: Football Clubs’ Age (in years) (n=32) 
 
Table 2 shows the annual turnover of the 30 clubs (2 of them did not provide the necessary figures 
which participated in the Greek Super League from 2005 to 2014. Unfortunately, there was no data 
published for the 2013-14 season, even when this research was being completed. Table 3 comprises 
of the year-to-year difference in turnover for every club. Undeniably, the most important finding is 
the effect of the division in which a football club participates, on its turnover. It is obvious that teams 
which competed both in Super League and in lower categories, have experienced a much larger 
turnover during their participation in the highest professional division of the Greek football. The most 
characteristic example is Platanias Chanion; in its 1st year in Super League (2013-14) saw its turnover 
rising by 779.08% compared to the previous season (from €0.31m to €2.74m).  
It is also noteworthy that there were considerable fluctuations throughout these 8 years in the 
turnover of Super League’s clubs. The lowest total turnover of €58.2m was noted in 2006 but after 4 
years it reached a peak of €153m (2010) before decreasing again.  
In 2013, the turnover of Super League’s clubs fell just below €100m. In general, during these 8 years 
clubs’ total turnover increased from €58.2m to €98.9m, a significant 69.9% rise. Moreover, it is 
obvious that the largest amount of the turnover is the financial activities product of 3-4 specific clubs. 
A characteristic example is that of Olympiacos, as in 2012 its turnover was €67m (more than half of 
the total €124m), while in 2013 it reached the amount of €61.4m, an amount which constituted the 
62.1% of the total €98.9m. 
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No Teams 
Annual Turnover (in million €) 
2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
1 OLYMPIACOS 18.94 
24.43 
(29) 
36.54 
(49.6) 
44.93 
(23) 
65.03 
(44.7) 
37.19 
(-42.8) 
67.00 
(80.2) 
61.35 
(-8.4) 
2 PANATHINAIKOS 14.67 
12.25 
(-16.5) 
12.54 
(2.3) 
21.71 
(73.2) 
21.06 
(-3) 
17.38 
(-17.5) 
15.71 
(-9.6) 
7.68 
(-51.1) 
3 AEK 11.46 
14.33 
(25) 
17.95 
(25.3) 
18.70 
(4.2) 
17.97 
(-9.3) 
14.26 
(-16) 
7.65 
(-46.4) 
n/a 
4 PAOK 9.35 
7.78 
(-16.8) 
10.06 
(29.4) 
12.13 
(20.6) 
13.38 
(10.2) 
14.40 
(7.7) 
13.83 
(-4) 
9.48 
(-31.5) 
5 IRAKLIS 2.35 
2.14 
(-9.3) 
2.00 
(-6.4) 
1.96 
(-2) 
1.43 
(-27.1) 
n/a n/a n/a 
6 ARIS 1.55 
5.16 
(232.9) 
9.62 
(86.4) 
12.30 
(27.9) 
11.99 
(-2.6) 
14.59 
(21.8) 
5.89 
(-59.6) 
5.27 
(-10.5) 
7 SKODA XANTHI 2.58 
2.71 
(4.9) 
3.08 
(13.5) 
2.85 
(-7.4) 
3.01 
(5.7) 
2.53 
(-16.1) 
2.29 
(-9.4) 
3.93 
(71.6) 
8 
ATROMITOS 
ATHINON 
0.57 
0.56 
(-0.8) 
1.47 
(161.8) 
0.25 
(-83.3) 
3.76 
(1431.7) 
4.20 
(11.6) 
3.63 
(-13.7) 
3.53 
(-2.6) 
9 AEL 1964 1.26 
1.56 
(24.2) 
1.38 
(-11.9) 
0.97 
(-29.6) 
0.82 
(-15.7) 
1.24 
(52) 
0.74 
(-40.5) 
0.47 
(-35.8) 
10 
APOLLON 
KALAMARIAS 
1.16 
0.90 
(-22.6) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
11 EGALEO 0.24 
0.23 
(-5.7) 
0.05 
(-78.4) 
0.02 
(-66) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
12 PANIONIOS 0.12 
2.12 
(1621.8) 
4.88 
(130.5) 
3.88 
(-20.5) 
5.49 
(41.4) 
4.23 
(-22.9) 
n/a n/a 
13 IONIKOS 0.35 
0.16 
(-53.7) 
0.10 
(-39) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
14 OFI 3.29 
2.98 
(-9.4) 
2.56 
(-14.1) 
2.06 
(-19.8) 
1.20 
(-41.8) 
0.78 
(-34.9) 
n/a n/a 
15 LEVADIAKOS 0.36 
0.09 
(-73.9) 
0.33 
(254.6) 
0.15 
(-54.4) 
0.29 
(88.2) 
0.06 
(-77.8) 
0.18 
(185.6) 
0.23 
(25) 
16 KALITHEA 1.37 
0.19 
(-86.4) 
0.40 
(115.3) 
0.23 
(-42.8) 
0.07 
(-71.3) 
0.29 
(336.4) 
0.06 
(-62.1) 
n/a 
17 AKRATITOS n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
18 ERGOTELIS 0.14 
0.44 
(224.8) 
1.79 
(304.8) 
1.18 
(-33.9) 
2.54 
(114.5) 
2.63 
(3.6) 
2.00 
(-24) 
0.40 
(-80.1) 
19 KERKYRA 0.16 
1.31 
(719.6) 
0.55 
(-57.8) 
0.54 
(-1.9) 
0.79 
(45.7) 
3.22 
(306.5) 
n/a n/a 
20 ASTERAS TRIPOLIS n/a 0.53 
1.87 
(254.8) 
2.45 
(30.8) 
2.59 
(5.7) 
2.58 
(-0.2) 
3.10 
(20.1) 
3.24 
(4.6) 
21 VERIA 0.07 
0.08 
(4) 
0.47 
(520.8) 
0.05 
(-88.8) 
0.02 
(54.7) 
0.05 
(120) 
n/a n/a 
22 PANTHRAKIKOS n/a 1.20 
0.15 
(-87.1) 
0.75 
(386.5) 
0.90 
(20.1) 
0.72 
(-19.7) 
0.14 
(-80.7) 
0.27 
(90) 
23 PANSERRAIKOS 0.17 
0.44 
(164) 
0.45 
(1) 
0.72 
(61.5) 
0.37 
(-48.4) 
0.40 
(8.7) 
0.06 
(-84.1) 
n/a 
24 THRASYVOULOS 0.80 
1.79 
(124.6) 
1.54 
(-14) 
2.16 
(40.1) 
0.74 
(-65.9) 
n/a n/a n/a 
25 PAS GIANNINA n/a 0.57 0.32 0.94 1.74 1.58 1.40 1.18 
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Table 2: Super League Clubs’ Annual Turnover 2005-2014 (in million €) 
*in red the period when the teams were participating in a lower division 
**numbers in parentheses indicate the year-to-year percentages’ differences 
 
(-43.4) (191.9) (84) (-9.3) (-11.1) (-16.1) 
26 KAVALA 0.05 
0.07 
(53.5) 
0.06 
(-15.3) 
0.21 
(245.1) 
1.99 
(861.8) 
n/a n/a n/a 
27 
OLYMPIAKOS 
VOLOU 
0.21 
0.17 
(-18.5) 
0.05 
(-71.5) 
1.31 
(-2532.3) 
1.28 
(-2.4) 
n/a n/a n/a 
28 PANETOLIKOS 0.38 
0.58 
(53.3) 
0.62 
(7) 
0.70 
(13.7) 
0.95 
(35.6) 
0.72 
(-24.5) 
1.30 
(81.4) 
0.47 
(-64.1) 
29 DOXA DRAMAS n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
30 
PLATANIAS 
CHANION 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.32 
0.31 
(-2.3) 
2.74 
(779.1) 
31 APOLLON 0.1 
0.01 
(-98.5) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.11 
0.13 
(27.4) 
32 AEL KALLONIS n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.43 
0.44 
(2.3) 
 TOTAL (SL) 58.16 
79.06 
(35.9) 
106.54 
(34.6) 
128.90 
(21) 
152.99 
(18.7) 
118.85 
(-28.7) 
123.98 
(4.3) 
98.86 
(-25.4) 
 
 
 
b. Variables’ Presentation 
Having in mind that the focal point of this research is the assessment and the analysis of important 
board characteristics, the following variables are being presented: 
 Total Number of Board Memberships: is captured by the total number of clubs’ directorships 
(for a minimum service of one month) throughout the years, including the interlocking directorates. 
 Total Number of Board Members: is identified by the number of directors who served the 
Super League clubs’ boards at least for one month during the 9-year period. This figure results by 
deducting the existing interlocking directorates and/or cross directorships from the total number of 
memberships. 
 Gender of Board Members: is measured by the number of men and women who served the 
clubs via the directors’ position. This number is calculated after a careful examination of their full 
names. 
 Total Number of Chairpersons and “pure” Chairpersons: is captured by measuring the 
number of Chairpersons, as well as the figure of the board members that only hold a Chairpersonship 
without being CEOs.  
 Total Number of CEOs and “pure” CEOs: is calculated by finding the number of CEOs as well 
as those CEOs who did not hold the Chairpersons’ position during their tenure. 
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 Gender of Chairpersons and CEOs: is identified by observing the Chairpersons’ and CEOs’ full 
names. 
 Occupation: in order to classify the directors depending on their profession, the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (2008) was implemented. ISCO constitutes an International 
Labour Organization (ILO) categorization structure.  
 Average Tenure of Directors (in months):  is identified by calculating firstly the tenure of every 
director, then the sum of all tenures and finally dividing it by the directors’ number. 
 Average Tenure of Directors (excluding Chairpersons and CEOs): is measured by measuring 
the tenure of directors, without including Chairpersons and CEOs, then the sum of all tenures and 
dividing it with by total number. 
 Average Tenure of Chairpersons and “pure” Chairpersons (in months): is determined by 
calculating the tenure of Chairperson, then the tenures’ sum and finally dividing it by the 
Chairpersons’ total number. The average tenure of “pure” Chairpersons is obtained by following the 
same method. 
 Average Tenure of CEOs and “pure” CEOs (in months): is found by calculating the tenure of 
every CEO, secondly the sum of their tenures and thirdly by dividing it by the CEOs’ number of months 
served over the years. At the same time, the average tenure of “pure” CEOs for the 2005-2014 period 
is determined by following the above method. 
 Board Size: is identified by the exact number of directors serving in football clubs’ boards in 
the end of every football season (30 June) from 2006 to 2014. 
 Average Board Size: is measured by dividing the sum of the boards’ size of each season (30 
June) by the number of the years clubs participated in Super League. 
 CEO Duality vs Separation: is measured by closely examining in the end of each season (30 
June) if the Chairperson of a football club has simultaneously the position of CEO or not. 
 Interlocking Directorates: is calculated by examining the full names of all directors who served 
the 31 Super League’s football clubs for at least one month during the 2005-2014 period. This 
procedure intended to identify if there were some directors who served in the boards of 2 or more 
different boards simultaneously. By following this method cross directorships across the 9-year period 
(2005-2014) were also captured. 
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Findings 
i. Total Board Memberships and Total Board Members  
During the 2005-2014 period, there were 677 directorships in the boards of Greek Super League 
clubs. These directorships were held by 673 directors. The number of the cross-directorships was 4. 
Furthermore, during the 9-year period there was an average of 21.8 directors who served a football 
club having a standard deviation of 17.9. At the same time, the maximum number of a club’s directors 
was observed at Panionios, as there were 74 members between these 9 years while the smallest 
number of members served was 14 at Skoda Xanthi.  
Diagram 5 demonstrates the number of directors who served the clubs during the 9-years period.  
In more detail directors’ number in clubs’ boards was: 
 in 9 clubs up to 10 
 in 14 clubs ranged from 11 to 30 
 in 6 clubs varied from 31 to 50 
 in 2 clubs more than 50 
 
 
 
Diagram 5: Total board members in each football club from 2005 to 2014 (n=31) 
 
ii. Gender of Board Members 
Football industry is widely known as male-dominated and hence the presence of women in football 
clubs’ boards is relatively scarce. Only 20 (3%) women out of the total of 673 directors participated in 
the clubs’ boards during these 9 years.  
It is worth mentioning that in Levadiakos’s board there were 4 women, while only one woman held a 
CEO position and that all chairpersons’ positions were held only by men. Table 3 demonstrates the 
29%
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descriptive statistics for the total of male and female directors. 
2005-2014 
Total 
Directors 
Male     
Directors 
Female 
Directors 
Average 21.8 21.2 0.7 
Standard Deviation 17.9 17.6 1.1 
Minimum 4 4 0 
Maximum 74 72 4 
Total 673 653 20 
Table 3: Male and Female Board Directors for the period 2005-2014 (n=31) 
 
iii. Number of Chairpersons and “pure” Chairpersons 
According to Table 4, the total number of Chairpersons who served the football clubs’ boards for the 
period 2005-2014 was 78 with an average number of 2.5 for each team and a standard deviation of 
2.1.  
More specifically the clubs were served: 
 14 clubs by one Chairperson 
 7 clubs by two Chairpersons 
 3 clubs by three Chairpersons 
 2 clubs by four Chairpersons 
 1 club by five Chairpersons 
 3 clubs by six Chairpersons 
 1 club by the record number of ten Chairpersons (Panionios) 
The number of individuals served strictly as Chairpersons (without being CEOs at the same time), 
called “pure” Chairpersons was 23, an average of 0.7 per club (Table 4).  In more detail: 
 13 clubs were served by one “pure” Chairperson 
 1 club was served by two “pure” Chairpersons (AEK) 
 1 club was served by eight “pure” Chairpersons (Panionios) 
while 
 16 clubs were characterized by duality (The Chairperson was also the CEO of the club) 
 
2005-2014 Chairpersons 
"Pure" 
Chairpersons 
Average 2.5 0.7 
Standard Deviation 2.1 1.5 
Minimum 1 0 
Maximum 10 8 
Total 78 23 
Table 4: Number of Chairpersons and “pure” Chairpersons for the period 2005-2014 
(in months) 
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iv.  Number of CEOs and “pure” CEOs 
As Table 5 indicates the number of CEOs, who served the Super League clubs’ boards during the 
previous 9 seasons, was 81; that is an average number of 2.6 per club and a standard deviation 2. 
Notably, the largest number of CEOs who served in a club was 8, while and the minimum was 1.  
In more detail, these were the CEOs’ changes: 
 6 clubs changed their CEO once  
 4 clubs changed their CEO twice 
 3 clubs changed their CEO three times 
  2 clubs changed their CEO four times 
 1 club changed its CEO five times 
 2 clubs changed their CEO a record of seven times (Panathinaikos and Panionios) 
 13 clubs did not change their CEO throughout the examined years 
 
2005-2014 CEOs 
"Pure" 
CEOs 
Average 2.6 0.8 
Standard Deviation 2 1.3 
Minimum 1 0 
Maximum 8 6 
Total 81 26 
Table 5: Number of CEOs and “pure” CEOs for the period 2005-2014 
(in months) 
 
The number of “pure” CEOs was 26, an average number of 1.4 per club and a maximum number of 
6. “Pure” CEO served the boards of 15 (48.4%) out of 31 clubs, in 9 (29%) of which he/she remained 
in his/her position. In particular: 
 9 clubs were served by one “pure” CEO 
 4 clubs were served by two “pure” CEOs 
 1 club was served by three “pure” CEOs 
 1 club was served by six “pure” CEOs (Panionios) 
 16 clubs were not served by a “pure” CEO 
 
v.  Gender of Chairpersons and CEOs 
As it was analysed above, women comprise 3% (a total number of 20) of the total population which 
serves the Greek Super League football clubs (Table 6). Only 1 out of the 20 women held the CEO 
position, which is translated into 1.2% in relation with the total CEOs population. More specifically, 
Ms Sofia Kotsovolou was Kerkyra’s CEO from July 2010 to June 2013, during the 3-year participation 
of the club from Corfu island in Super League. It is worth mentioning that there were no women in 
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Chairpersonships’ positions. The above facts support the common belief that football industry is 
traditionally dominated by men and the extremely low possibility for a woman to hold a Chairperson 
or CEO role in a club’s board. 
Name Surname Position Club Tenure  
Dimitra Vasilakou Board Member AEL 1964 07/05-06/11  
Maria Xinou Board Member AEL 1964 07/05-04/08  
Maria Stamelou Board Member Akratitos 07/05-09/05  
Filio Georgiou Board Member Akratitos 07/05-09/05  
Georgia Kapetanaki Board Member Akratitos 10/05-06/06  
Alexandra Kaimenaki 2nd Vice President 
Asteras 
Tripolis 02/09-06/14  
Ekaterini Koxenoglou 
Board Member/ 
Deputy CEO 
Atromitos 
Athinon 
07/05-06/08 & 
07/09-06/14 
Charis Astrinaki Consultant Ergotelis 01/11-06/12  
Maria-
Christina Psomiadou Board Member Kavala 08/10-06/11  
Maria 
Kalogera-
Chondrou Board Member Kerkyra 07/06-06/07  
Sofia Kotsovolou CEO Kerkyra 07/10-06/13  
Ioanna Masonou Consultant Levadiakos 
07/05-06/06 & 
07/07-12/07  
Panagiota Kiriazi Consultant Levadiakos 
07/05-06/06 & 
07/07-06/10  
Maria Siabani Consultant Levadiakos 
01/08-06/10 & 
03/14-06/14  
Rigina Kolokitha Consultant Levadiakos 01/10-06/10  
Anna Loumidi Board Member Panathinaikos 07/05-08/08  
Maria 
Lomvardou-
Zoula Board Member Panathinaikos 02/11-04/13  
Pavlina Vagioni Board Member Panionios 
08/06-08/08 & 
01/09-04/10  
Avgoustina Maravelia Board Member Panionios 12/12  
Maria Goncharova Board Member PAOK 12/12-06/14  
Table 6: Female Board Directors for the period 2005-2014 
 
vi. Occupation 
Table 7 illustrates the professional occupation of the Greek football clubs’ directors. In order to 
categorize and analyze the occupations the “International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-08)” was adopted, which is a coding system of the “International Labour Organization” (ILO). 
This system classifies the occupations in ten major groups, eight of which were relevant to the 
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professions of the boards’ directors. 
The data concerns 332 directors (49.3%), nearly half of the total number of directors, as some football 
clubs did not provide the necessary information. The “manager’s” profession is the most common for 
Greek clubs’ directors, as the remarkable percentage of 43.7% (145) shows. More specifically, 81 
(24.4%) directors are business services and administration managers, as the vast majority of them are 
businessmen or entrepreneurs. Additionally, nearly 1 out of 4 (27.1%) were grouped in the 
“professionals” category, with the occupations of lawyer (6.3%) and economist (4.8%) dominating.  
Moreover, the “technicians and associate professionals” major group does not seem to be massively 
followed by football’s directors, as only 13 (3.9%) of them have a relevant occupation. Furthermore, 
52 (15.7%) boards’ members were categorized as “clerical support workers. Simultaneously, only 6 
(total of 1.8%) directors were grouped in the other 3 professional categories “service and sale 
workers”, “craft and related trade workers” and “plant and machine operators and assemblers”, hence 
their respective percentages are close to zero.  
Finally, there were 26 (7.8%) directors whose profession could not be classified. Summing up, the 
results show that there is that 7 out of 10 (70.4%) directors are either managers or professionals, 
while a remarkable number of 81 (24.4%) directors are business people or entrepreneurs holding a 
business services’ or administration managers’ position. To summarize football directors occupations’ 
are: 
 43.7% managers 
 27.1% professionals 
 3.9% technicians and associate professionals 
 15.7% clerical support workers 
 0.6% services and sales workers 
 0.3% craft and related trades workers 
 0.9% plant and machine operators and assemblers 
 7.8% N/A 
MAJOR 
GROUPS 
SUB MAJOR 
GROUPS 
MINOR 
GROUPS 
UNIT 
GROUPS 
FREQ. 
1. MANAGERS 
(145 OR 43.7%) 
11 CHIEF EXECUTIVES, 
SENIOR OFFICIALS AND 
LEGISLATORS 
111 LEGISLATORS AND SENIOR 
OFFICIALS 
1112 SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 4 
1113 TRADITIONAL CHIEFS AND HEADS 
OF VILLAGE 
1 
112 MANAGING DIRECTORS AND CHIEF 
EXECUTIVES 
1120 MANAGING DIRECTORS AND CHIEF 
EXECUTIVES 
21 
12 ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
COMMERCIAL MANAGERS 
121 BUSINESS SERVICES AND 
ADMINISTRATION MANAGERS 
1219 BUSINESS SERVICES AND 
ADMINISTRATION MANAGERS NOT 
ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED 
81 
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13 PRODUCTION AND 
SPECIALIZED SERVICES 
MANAGERS 
132 MANUFACTURING, MINING, 
CONSTRUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION 
MANAGERS 
1323 CONSTRUCTION MANAGERS 6 
134 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
MANAGERS 
1342 HEALTH SERVICES MANAGERS 1 
14 HOSPITALITY, RETAIL 
AND OTHER SERVICES 
MANAGERS 
141 HOTEL AND RESTAURANT 
MANAGERS 
1411 HOTEL MANAGERS 2 
142 RETAIL AND WHOLESALE TRADE 
MANAGERS 
1420 RETAIL AND WHOLESALE TRADE 
MANAGERS 
29 
2. PROFESSIONALS 
(90 OR 27.1%) 
21 SCIENCE AND 
ENGINEERING 
PROFESSIONALS 
211 PHYSICAL AND EARTH SCIENCE 
PROFESSIONALS 
2113 CHEMISTS 1 
214 ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALS 
(EXCLUDING ELECTRO TECHNOLOGY 
2142 CIVIL ENGINEERS 5 
2145 CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 1 
2149 ENGINEERS PROFESSIONALS NOT 
ELSEWEHERE CLASSIFIED 
2 
216 ARCHITECTS, PLANNERS, 
SURVEYORS AND DESIGNERS 
2161 BUILDING ARCHITECTS 4 
2165 CARTOGRAPHERS AND SURVEYORS 1 
22 HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
221 MEDICAL DOCTORS 
2211 GENERALIST MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
8 
2212 SPECIALIST MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
3 
225 VETERINARIANS 2250 VETERINARIANS 1 
226 OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
2261 DENTISTS 1 
2262 PHARMACISTS 2 
2264 PHYSIOTHERAPISTS 1 
23 TEACHING 
PROFESSIONALS 
232 VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
TEACHERS 
2320 MATHEMATICIANS, ACTUARIES 
AND STATISTICIANS 
1 
233 SECONDARY EDUCATION TEACHERS 2330 SECONDARY EDUCATION TEACHERS 8 
24 BUSINESS AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
PROFESSIONALS 
241 FINANCE PROFESSIONALS 
2411 ACCOUNTANTS 5 
2412 FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS 
4 
26 LEGAL, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL PROFESSIONALS 
261 LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 2611 LAWYERS 21 
263 SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS 
PROFESSIONALS 
2631 ECONOMISTS 16 
264 AUTHORS, JOURNALISTS AND 
LINGUISTS 
2642 JOURNALISTS 3 
265 CREATIVE AND PERFORMING 
ARTISTS 
2652 MUSICIANS, SINGERS AND 
COMPOSERS 
2 
3. TECHNICIANS 
AND ASSOCIATE 
PROFESSIONALS 
(13 OR 3.9%) 
31 SCIENCE AND 
ENGINEERING ASSOCIATE 
PROFESSIONALS 
311 PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING 
SCIENCE TECHNICIANS 
3113 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
TECHNICIANS 
2 
315 SHIP AND AIRCRAFT CONTROLLERS 
AND TECHNICIANS 
3152 SHIP’S DECK OFFICERS AND PILOTS 1 
32 HEALTH ASSOCIATE 
PROFESSIONALS 
321 MEDICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL 
TECHNICIANS 
3211 MEDICAL IMAGING AND 
THERAPEUTIC 
 EQUIPMENT TECHNICIANS 
 
1 
33 BUSINESS AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS 
332 SALES AND PURCHASING AGENTS 
AND BROKERS 
3321 INSURANCE REPRESENTATIVES 1 
3324 TRADE BROKERS 1 
335 REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS 
3359 REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS NOT 
ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED 
2 
34 LEGAL, SOCIAL, 
CULTURAL AND RELATED 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS 
342 SPORTS AND FITNESS WORKERS 
3421 ATHLETES AND SPORTS PLAYERS 3 
3422 SPORTS COACHES, INSTRUCTORS 
AND OFFICIALS 
1 
3423 FITNESS AND RECREATION 
INSTRUCTORS AND PROGRAM LEADERS 
1 
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Table 7: Occupation of Board Directors for the period 2005-2014 
vii. Average Tenure of Directors 
Regarding the directors’ average tenure, it is worth mentioning that in nearly half of the clubs (14 
or 45.2%), board members’ service lasted from 13 to 24 months. Diagram 6 shows in more detail 
the directors’ average tenure in Super League’s clubs: 
 in 6 clubs up to 12 months 
 in 14 clubs between 13 and 24 months 
 in 6 clubs between 25 and 36 months 
 in 1 club between 37 and 48 months 
 in 3 clubs between 49 and 60 months 
 in 1 club between 61 and 72 months (Asteras Tripolis) 
 
 
4. CLERICAL 
SUPPORT 
WORKERS 
(52 OR 15.7%) 
41 GENERAL AND 
KEYBOARD CLERKS 
411 GENERAL OFFICE CLERKS 4110 GENERAL OFFICE CLERKS 38 
42 CUSTOMER SERVICES 
CLERKS 
421 TELLERS, MONEY COLLECTORS AND 
RELATED CLERKS 
4211 BANK TELLERS AND RELATED CLERKS 12 
422 CLIENT INFORMATION WORKERS 
4221 TRAVEL CONSULTANTS AND CLERKS 
 
2 
 
5 .SERVICE AND 
SALES WORKERS 
(2 OR 0.6%) 
54 PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
WORKERS 
541 PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKERS 
5411 FIRE-FIGHTERS 1 
5412 POLICE OFFICERS 1 
7. CRAFT AND 
RELATED TRADES 
WORKERS 
(1 OR 0.3%) 
74 ELECTRICAL AND 
ELECTRONIC TRADES 
WORKERS 
741 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
INSTALLERS AND REPAIRERS 
7411 BUILDING AND RELATED 
ELECTRICIANS 
1 
8. PLANT AND 
MACHINE 
OPERATORS, AND 
ASSEMBLERS 
(3 OR 0.9%) 
83 DRIVERS AND MOBILE 
PLANT OPERATORS 
832 HEAVY TRUCKS AND BUS DRIVERS 832 CAR,TAXI AND VAN DRIVERS 2 
835 SHIP’S DECK CREWS AND RELATED 
WORKERS 
835 SHIP’S DECK CREWS AND RELATED 
WORKERS 
1 
N/A (26 OR 7.8%)    26 
   SUM 332 
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Diagram 6: Average Tenure of all Directors in months (n=31) 
 
Table 8 reveals that the average tenure of all the football clubs’ directors was 23.8 months per club 
and their standard deviation was 15.4 months. The minimum period that directors served a football 
club was 4.9 months at Akratitos (the club from West Attica participated in SL for only one year), 
whereas the maximum was 71.9 months at Asteras Tripolis (in 7 years of SL presence).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii. Average Tenure of Directors (excluding Chairpersons and CEOs) 
The average tenure of boards’ members, without including Chairpersons and CEOs was 22.7 months 
with a standard deviation of 15.6. By excluding the clubs’ Chairpersons and the CEOs from the 
calculation of the average tenure, it is noticed that the average tenure is 1.1 months lower and the 
standard deviation is slightly higher than the respective figures of the whole board. This fact shows 
that the average tenure of directors was a little lower than the CEOs’ and Chairpersons’one.  
 
2005-2014 Directors 
Average tenure 23.8 
Standard Deviation 15.4 
Minimum 4.9 
Maximum 71.9 
   
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
up to 12 13 to 24 25 to 36 37 to 48 49 to 60 61 to 72
19.4%
45.2%
19.4%
3.2%
9.6%
3.2%
Average Tenure of Directors 
Table 8: Average tenure of Board Directors for the period 2005-2014 (in months) 
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ix.  Average Tenure of Chairpersons and “pure” Chairpersons 
Diagram 7 reveals that the Chairpersons’ average tenure lasted:  
 in 21 clubs up to 24 months 
 in 6 clubs from 25 to 48 months 
 in 2 clubs from 49 to 72 months 
 in 2 clubs more than 72 months (96 months at Atromitos Athinon and 108 months at Skoda 
Xanthi) 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
Diagram 7: Average Tenure of Chairpersons in months (n=31) 
 
As Table 9 demonstrates, the shortest Chairpersons’ tenure was 4 months at Olympiakos Volou (1-
year presence at SL), while the longest was 108 months. Consequently, there has been 1 (3.2%) 
football club (Skoda Xanthi) whose Chairperson (Mr Aristeidis Pialoglou) remained in his position for 
the whole 2005-2014 period. Moreover, the Chairpersons’ average tenure was 28.8 months with a 
standard deviation of 24.3 months. 
From the 31 examined football clubs, 15 (48.4%) of them had a “pure” Chairperson (a director who 
was holding exclusively the Chairperson role without being CEO at the same time). For the 9-year 
period (2005-2014) the average tenure of “pure” Chairpersons was 26.8 months, whereas standard 
deviation was 25.3 (Table 9). Hence, we observe that the average tenure of “pure” Chairpersons was 
slightly lower than the “non-pure” Chairpersons. Additionally, the minimum tenure of “pure” 
Chairpersons was 2 months at AEK and the maximum 108 at Skoda Xanthi.  
More precisely, “pure” Chairpersons’ average tenure was: 
 in 9 clubs up to 24 months 
 in 5 clubs from 24 to 48 months 
 in 1 club over 72 months (108 months at Skoda Xanthi) 
 
67.6%
19.4%
6.5%
6.5%
Average Tenure of Chairpersons
up to 24 25 to 48 49 to 72 more than 72
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2005-2014 Chairpersons 
"Pure" 
Chairpersons 
Average tenure 28.8 26.8 
Standard Deviation 24.3 25.3 
Minimum 4 2 
Maximum 108 108 
Table 9: Average Tenure of Chairpersons and “pure” Chairpersons for the period 2005-2014 
(in months) 
 
x.  Average Tenure of CEOs and “pure” CEOs 
According to Diagram 8 the vast majority of football clubs (71% or 22 clubs) run by CEOs with an 
average tenure up to 24 months. More specifically, CEOs’ average tenure in clubs’ boards was: 
 in 22 clubs up to 24 months 
 in 6 clubs between 25 and 48 months 
 in 1 club between 49 and 72 months (AEL 1964) 
 in 2 clubs over 72 months (Atromitos Athinon and Skoda Xanthi) 
 
 
Diagram 8:  Average Tenure of CEOs in months (n=31) 
 
As it is presented in Table 10, the average tenure of Chief Executive Officers in Greek football clubs’ 
boards was 28.3 months. Standard deviation is equivalent to 24.4 months, while the minimum 
average tenure was 4 months at Akratitos, whereas the maximum was 108 at Skoda Xanthi. 
Extending the study it was found that 15 clubs were served by “pure” CEOs (boards’ members who 
held exclusively this position). “Pure” CEOs’ average tenure was 24.6 months (SD= 26.1 months) 
(Table 10). Maximum tenure of CEOs in clubs’ boards was 108 months whereas the shortest period 
of their service was 2 months (AEK). Summarizing, the average tenure of “pure” CEOs was: 
 in 10 clubs up to 24 months 
71%
19.4%
3.2%
6.4%
Average Tenure of CEOs 
up to 24
25 to 48
49 to 72
more than
72
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 in 4 clubs from 24 to 48 months 
 in 1 club more than 72 months (Mr Nikolaos Epitropou served Skoda Xanthi’s board for 
108   months) 
 16 clubs were characterized by duality (they did not have “pure” CEO, as he was 
Chairperson at the same time) 
 
2005-2014 CEOs 
"Pure" 
CEOs 
Average tenure 28.3 24.6 
Standard Deviation 24.4 26.1 
Minimum 4 2 
Maximum 108 108 
   
 
xi.  Board Size 
The figures on the table presented below were as of 30th June of each year, which is the last day of 
the football season, while the total number of football clubs for the period 2005-2014 was 31. As it is 
shown on Table 11, throughout the years there have been a great number of fluctuations in the Super 
League clubs’ board size, but in general it varied from 8 to 10 members.  
The lowest average board size was 7.6 members in 2007, whereas the highest average was 10.2 
members in 2012, a significant difference of 2.6 members. Additionally, standard deviation ranged 
between 2.1 and 4.1, while the minimum average number of members varied from 3 to 6 through 
the years. Furthermore, the maximum average number of boards’ directors was between 11 and 20 
for the period 2005-2014. 
2005-2014 
Board size 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(30 June) 
n=16 n=16 n=16 n=16 n=16 n=16 n=15 n=16 n=18 
Average 8.1 7.6 7.9 9.3 8.8 9.5 10.2 8.3 7.8 
Std. Dev. 2.1 2.6 2.9 3.9 3.8 4.1 3.8 3 3.2 
Minimum 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 3 3 
Maximum 11 11 15 20 19 20 15 15 15 
Table 11: Board size for the period 2005-2014 
 
xii. Average Board Size 
The average board size of football clubs for the period between 2005 and 2014 was 8.2 members per 
club with a standard deviation of 2.8. At the same time, the minimum average number of a board was 
 
Table 10: Average tenure of CEOs’ and “pure” CEOs’ for the period 2005-2014 (in months) 
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4 and the maximum 15.3.  
More specifically, as it is indicated on Diagram 9, the average members’ number in a club’s board 
was: 
 in 10 clubs up to 6 
 in 13 clubs from 7 to 9 
 in 5 clubs from 10 to 12 
 in 3 clubs from 13 to 16 
 
 
Diagram 9: Average Board Size for the period 2005-2014 
 
xiii. Separation vs Duality 
The CEO/Chair duality was assessed based on the 30th June data of every year, which represents the 
final day of the football season. In total, 31 boards’ clubs were examined during this 9-year period 
(2005-2014). 
Looking at the fluctuations, it is worth mentioning that there is a significant change in the separation 
vs duality preference of the clubs. Despite the fact that in the 1st season (2005-2006) the clubs 
choosing the separation model were equal to these which followed the duality one, in the last season 
of our research (2013-2014) the overwhelming majority of clubs adopted the duality model for their 
governance. More specifically, in 14 out of 18 clubs the Chairperson was holding simultaneously the 
CEO role.  
32.3%
41.9%
16.1%
9.7%
Average Board Size  
up to 6 7 to 9 10 to12 13 to 16
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Diagram 10: Duality vs Separation for the period 2005-2014 
 
xiv.  Interlocking Directorates/Cross directorships 
As it was expected there was not any direct interlocking in the Super League football clubs during the 
observed 9-year period (2005-2014). As it can be seen in Table 12, a limited number of 4 (0.06%) 
directors sat in the board of two clubs but in a different period of time.  
This constitutes an extremely significant finding of the research, as it reveals the emotional ties 
between Greek football clubs’ and board members. Furthermore, it brings to light their deep loyalty 
and their commitment which along with the emotional bounds constitute the undoubted factors for 
which the directors do not serve more than one club. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
This study's main aim was to explore the corporate governance system in the Greek professional 
football clubs. More specifically, the research examines the essential board characteristics of the 
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Separation vs Duality
Duality
Separation
Full Names Cross Directorships 
Christos Daras Akratitos 10/05 to 06/06 Panionios 12/13-06 /14 
Georgios Kintis 
AEK 07/05 to 10/05  
&  
12/08 to 01/09 
Panionios 05/10-10/10 
Ioannis Lenas Akratitos 07/05-09/05 Kavala 06/09-06/11  
Achilleas Beos Panionios 07/05-12/05 Olympiakos Volou 02/11 
Table 12: Cross Directorships for the period 2005-2014 
 
©Review of the HOCG                                                                                                                                                                                                        ISSN 1759-0108 
Page | 32  
 
Greek football clubs between 2005 and 2014. Based on secondary data, collected from the Greek 
“Government Gazette”, the study explored extensively a number of significant corporate governance 
variables of the Greek “Super League” football teams in a nine-year period 2005-2014. 
Among the noteworthy findings was the very limited female representation on Football Clubs boards. 
In their synthesis, males largely dominate and only 3% of board members during those 9 years were 
women, while only one woman held a superior position, that of CEO.  
Occupation of directors is another important variable of our research which revealed a domination 
of the management profession, as almost half of the directors list “manager” as their occupation. 
Hence, it can be concluded that Greek clubs’ boardrooms lack in occupation’s diversity.  
Moreover, another interesting finding was the absolute lack of direct interlocking directorates in the 
football teams; this speaks of the board members' loyalty and their emotional ties to their “own” 
club. Board members are committed only to one club, with the exception of just 4 directors in 9 years, 
who served in different team boards, not simultaneously, but during different time periods. 
Regarding the board size, our study has shown that it has been quite fluctuating; more than 40% of 
the clubs’ boards consisted of 7 to 9 members, while the average board size of the 31 teams was 8.23 
members. Consequently, the boards examined in this study were neither too small nor large. 
Furthermore, the average tenure of the whole board was 23.78 months and 22.72 months excluding 
Chairpersons and CEOs. Both figures could be characterized relatively short. 
Finally, the study has found that CEO/Chairperson duality is widely present for 8 of the 9 years that 
were examined, with the exception of the 2005-2006 season, when only half the boards adopted the 
duality mode of governance. In fact, during the season 2013/14, 14 out of 18 teams chose duality 
over separation. This fact reveals that it is a common phenomenon for Greek teams’ CEOs to act also 
as Chairpersons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: It is essential to clarify the terms of “directorship” and “director”. When we refer to a “director” 
we mean the individual who serves the Board, while by using the word “directorship” we state the 
position held by the director. 
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